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produce, difficult to specify, and the market has few buyers and sellers, cost- 
reimbursement contracts are more likely. These arguments were tested with five 
years of data (FY 2004–2008) drawn from the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS), the most comprehensive and largely untapped database on 
federal contracting practices. Over 2,000 Defense Department contracts were 
examined, charting contract type (i.e., fixed-price vs. cost-reimbursement) 
across simple and complex products. The results confirm conventional wisdom 
about public sector procurement practice, at least within the Defense 
Department: product characteristics and market conditions drive the use of 
fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts. This research lays the foundation 
for research on contract outcomes by identifying factors that drive the use of 
different contract types and producing unique measures of product characteris-
tics that are not currently available in the literature. 
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In 2011, the United States Air Force signed a contract with the Boeing 
Corporation, a major defense contractor, to produce a new aerial refueling 
plane. According to a 2014 GAO report, the program is the Air Force’s highest 
acquisition priority (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014). Aerial 
refueling tankers increase the reach and carrying capacity of military aircraft, 
substantially magnifying U.S. air power capabilities. Boeing is expected to 
meet most contract schedule and budget targets—with one exception: 
development costs are projected to exceed the initial estimate of $4.9 billion 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014). The extent of the overrun is 
a matter of debate, but because the contract has a fixed-price payment method, 
Boeing, and not U.S. taxpayers, will be on the hook for any overruns. Fixed- 
price contracts place the burden of any cost overrun on the vendor rather than 
the purchasing agency. The ability to shield the public purse from the risk of 
cost overruns has made fixed-priced contracting politically popular. In 2009, 
the Obama administration guided agencies to increase the use of fixed-price 
contracts relative to cost-reimbursement contracts (Office of the Press Secretary, 
The White House, 2009). 
However, fixed-price contracts are not a cure-all for cost overruns and other 
contract performance issues. Consider the example of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) fixed-price contract in the late 1980s with defense contractor 
McDonnell Douglas for the A-12 Avenger II, a cutting-edge attack aircraft. 
When a series of technical challenges led to delays and cost overruns, the 
DoD terminated the program and accused McDonnell Douglas of violating con-
tract terms. The company argued that the contract itself was the problem: Its 
fixed-price structure was inappropriate, given that the DoD had asked 
McDonnell Douglas to engage in unplanned research and development for an 
unproven aircraft. The dispute wound up costing both sides significant legal 
fees, further escalating overall costs, and the A-12 Avenger II was never 
delivered (Blakey, 2011). 
These two examples highlight the impact of contract type on contract out-
comes. In an effort to secure best value for purchasing agencies, federal policy 
and regulatory guidance in the United States promote the use of fixed-price con-
tracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts are to be used only in those instances in 
which there is uncertainty about what is required to produce a product.1 Vendors 
are unlikely to enter into a contract without some certainty that they will recoup 
their research-and-development costs. While cost-reimbursement and other con-
tracts that put cost-overrun risks on the purchasing government are allowable, 
policy and regulatory guidance discourages agencies from buying products they 
cannot specify at the point of purchase. 
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The holy grail of research on government contracting is to understand the 
factors that deliver the win-win, a product that meets the needs of the purchasing 
government at a price it can afford and payment to the vendor that exceeds its 
production costs. Given the evidence on the importance of contract type for con-
tract outcomes (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c), a first step is to understand what drives the use of different types of con-
tracts. On the one hand, this inquiry is pedestrian: Conventional wisdom among 
public procurement professionals suggests that government procurement offi-
cials select the type of contract that best matches the attributes of the product 
to be purchased. On the other hand, the function of systematic scholarship is 
to test conventional wisdom while simultaneously assessing the impact of other 
potential causal factors. The results of such an analysis provide the first-order 
conditions for understanding the conditions that promote contract success. 
We draw from transaction cost economics to produce a conceptual framework 
that helps explain public-sector contract-type decisions. Transaction cost econom-
ics highlights the importance of product characteristics and market conditions, two 
sets of factors that are important guideposts in public procurement regulation and 
practice. Fixed-price contracts make the most sense to use when the product is easy 
to specify and easy to produce, like a paper clip or grounds maintenance. The ven-
dor is content to accept the cost and performance risks because it knows what will 
be needed to produce the product. When the product is difficult to produce and dif-
ficult to specify, like an advanced weapon system or program-management ser-
vices, cost-reimbursement contracts are more appropriate. Not knowing exactly 
what it will take to produce the product or how much it will cost, the vendor will 
be reluctant to enter into the transaction unless the purchasing agency bears a larger 
share of the risk. Turning to market conditions, when the purchasing agency is one 
of a small number of buyers of a product for which there are many vendors, the 
purchasing agency has greater freedom to set favorable contract terms. When the 
situation is reversed—buyers are many and vendors are few—vendors have more 
opportunities to enter into exchanges that advantage their interests. 
To test these arguments, we draw five years of data (FY 2004–2008) from the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the most comprehensive and largely 
untapped database on federal contracting practices, to examine the contract type 
of over 2,000 DoD contracts. We select contracts from the DoD not because 
our interest is in defense acquisition, but because the DoD is the largest purchaser 
of the widest range of products in the federal government. This provides a baseline 
for future comparison to a wide range of other federal agencies. We complement 
the contract-design data with data gathered from an original survey of federal pro-
curement professionals on the characteristics of 29 different products. We use 
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these data to chart contract type (i.e., fixed-price vs. cost-reimbursement) across 
simple and complex products. These data allow us to assess the impact of product 
characteristics and market conditions on the pattern of contract-type decisions. 
The results of our analysis suggest that fixed-price contracts predominate 
when products are easy to specify and require few specialized investments, 
and that cost-reimbursement contracts are more common under the opposite 
conditions. The results also provide support for the impact of market conditions. 
In particular, as the Defense Department represents a larger share of the total 
sales of a product (i.e., its market power increases), the likelihood of a fixed- 
price contract increases. On the flipside, when the number of different industries 
purchasing a product increases (i.e., the market power of vendors increases), the 
likelihood of a cost-reimbursement contract increases. Taken together, our 
results confirm the conventional wisdom about public-sector procurement prac-
tice, at least within the DoD: product characteristics and market conditions drive 
the use of fixed-price versus cost-reimbursement contracts. 
Because our analysis validates conventional wisdom, our results are neither sur-
prising nor novel. They are confirmatory. The value of our research is twofold. 
First, our analysis lays the foundation for research on contract outcomes by identi-
fying factors that drive the use of different contract types. Future scholarship that 
seeks to understand the factors that give rise to cost overruns, poor-quality products, 
or delivery delays can use our model of contract-type decisions as a necessary build-
ing block. Second, we produce unique measures of product characteristics that are 
not currently available in the literature. Past research on product characteristics at 
the local level has proved useful to many scholars interested in the dynamics of 
local government contracting (e.g., Brown & Potoski, 2005; Hefetz & Warner, 
2012; Lamothe & Lamothe, 2012; Levin & Tadelis, 2010). We provide measures 
that can be used by scholars undertaking similar research at the federal level. 
This article is divided into six sections, including this introduction. In the 
second section, we lay out our theoretical argument. In the third section, we 
describe the data and methods used to conduct the analysis. In the fourth and 
fifth sections we report and discuss our results, respectively, highlighting the 
implications for practitioners. We conclude the article by summarizing our find-
ings and offering pathways for future research. 
Understanding Contract Types: The Impact of Product 
Characteristics and Market Conditions 
Government agencies face an implicit choice when it comes to production. A 
given product either can be produced internally, with one’s own resources, or 
it can be produced externally, through a contract with another organization. 
In the United States, in Fiscal Year 2014, the federal government acquired 
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$445 billion of products through contracts, around one third of all discretionary 
spending.2 The potential advantages of contracting—efficiencies, cost savings, 
and innovation—help to explain the heavy reliance on acquisition at the federal 
level (e.g., Kelman, 2002; Savas, 2005). Contracting also involves risks—cost 
overruns, delivery delays, and poor-quality products (e.g., Sclar, 2001). These 
risks can undermine contracting’s ability to contribute to the achievement of 
agency missions and objectives. 
Extant research on the effects of contracting has produced mixed results (e.g., 
Fernandez, 2009; Hodge & Greve, 2007; O’Toole & Meier, 2004). Focusing on 
cost savings and overruns—the outcome that has received the most scrutiny in the 
literature—some studies find that competitive contracting results in cost savings 
(Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2003; Hakim & Blackstone, 2013; Ivacko & Horner, 2014; 
Johnston & Seidenstat, 2007), while others find that contracting does not deliver 
cost savings (Bel & Warner, 2008), generates diminishing cost efficiencies over 
time (Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2008), or leads to increased costs (Thompson, 2011). 
Making sense of these findings is complicated by variations across studies in 
terms of national context, level of government (i.e., local, regional, national), 
product (e.g., prison management, refuse collection, water treatment), and cost 
components (e.g., current payouts from contracting vs. total costs over time). 
There is relative agreement that two interrelated sets of factors influence the 
likelihood of contract success or failure: product characteristics (e.g., Brown & 
Potoski, 2005; Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2010; Carr, LeRoux, & Shrestha, 
2008; Levin & Tadelis, 2010) and market characteristics (Bel & Warner, 2008; 
Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Warner & Bel, 2008; Wassenaar, Groot, & Gradus 
2013). Later in the article, we will unpack these factors and their impact on con-
tract type—the focus of the study—but the basic finding from this raft of studies 
is that uncompetitive markets and products whose outcomes are difficult to spe-
cify and lend themselves to monopoly provision increase the likelihood of cost 
overruns, delivery delays, and poor product quality (e.g., Brown, Potoski, & 
Van Slyke, 2013). There is also relative agreement that various managerial stra-
tegies can be pursued to reduce the threat of undesirable contract outcomes 
posed by these characteristics. For example, one school of thought focuses on 
market characteristics and argues that a principal managerial responsibility is 
to “manage the market” to engender competition (e.g., Brown & Potoski, 
2004; Girth, Hefetz, Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Johnston & Girth, 2012). A 
related school of thought encourages purchasing governments to engage in joint 
or mixed delivery to stimulate competition between public and private providers 
(Bel, Brown, & Warner 2014; Hefetz, Warner, & Vigoda-Gadot, 2014) or to 
encourage relational or collaborative partnerships between the two (Bel & 
Fageda, 2011; Bel, Hebdon, & Warner, 2007). A third variant recommends per-
formance management and incentives as a managerial tool to encourage 
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successful contract outcomes (Brown et al., 2013; Girth, 2014; Hefetz & 
Warner, 2004). Taken together, these studies find that harnessing the upside 
and mitigating the risks of contracting is increasingly an essential core manage-
ment function.3 
In an ideal world, external production would be governed by complete con-
tracts. The purchaser would specify what it wanted from the vendor in exacting 
detail. The vendor would then provide accurate cost estimates, ultimately yield-
ing a transparent and comprehensive agreement of what is to be produced and 
how much it will cost. Such a complete contract would guide both parties to a 
mutually beneficial outcome. But as scholars have long argued, buyers and sell-
ers are boundedly rational, and thus neither can know with exact certainty what 
future conditions will be (Coase, 1937). Factors like the price of key inputs (e.g., 
steel) or how the product will be used in the future will have important implica-
tions for whether the buyer and the seller each receives value from the exchange, 
yet the ability of the two parties to forecast these types of changes is limited. This 
lack of knowledge means that parties do not necessarily know how to secure their 
interests ex ante. As a result, contracts cannot be fully specified in advance, and 
the buyer and the seller will be exposed to risk. For the vendor, there is a chance 
that production costs will exceed what it expected. For the buyer, there is concern 
that the vendor will behave opportunistically by lowering service quality or run-
ning up charges to increase profits. Self-interested parties will—at least some of 
the time—behave contrary to the counterparty’s interests (Williamson, 1981). 
The costs of writing a contract to cover all these contingencies are too high to 
warrant moving forward with the exchange. Instead, buyers and sellers have to 
rely on incomplete contracts that specify as much as reasonably possible about 
the product, but leave some aspects of the exchange unspecified (Tirole, 1999). 
The best that can be done is to write contractual rules that guide the buyer and 
the seller toward actions that minimize the risks that one or both parties will 
receive a losing outcome. One of the most basic and important rules is contract 
type, which helps to structure the transaction by determining the method of pay-
ment. Broadly speaking, contracts come in two types—fixed-price and cost- 
reimbursement. Fixed-price contracts specify a final price for the product, 
shielding the buyer from risk because the vendor bears responsibility for any 
cost overruns. Fixed-price contracts create an incentive for the vendor to deter-
mine product characteristics and costs at the outset. Cost-reimbursement con-
tracts specify allowable charges (e.g., parts, labor, fuel) rather than set a price 
ex ante. The final price is determined ex post when all allowable charges are 
tabulated. Cost-reimbursement contracts shift the risk of cost overruns onto 
the buyer, because the vendor can pass on unexpected costs. The buyer faces 
an incentive to be as clear as possible about what it wants from the supplier 
and the means by which it should be produced. 
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Driven by the insight that fixed-price contracts place the risk of cost overruns on 
the vendor, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)—the primary regulations 
governing contracting at the federal level in the United States—promote the use 
of fixed-price contracts whenever possible.4 The FAR allows for the use of various 
forms of cost-reimbursement contracts only in instances where the seller is 
unlikely to enter into the agreement without certainty that it will recoup its invest-
ment costs. These regulatory rules establish the framework for decision-making 
but they are not self-executing (Cooper, 2002). Procurement professionals have 
discretion to make choices about contract type. Two sets of factors are likely to 
influence the decision—product characteristics and market conditions. 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
The field of transaction cost economics has identified various product character-
istics that impact whether the buyer and the seller receive the outcomes they 
anticipated from an exchange. When these product characteristics are present, 
the buyer or the seller incurs “transaction costs” to mitigate the risks of a failed 
exchange (Coase, 1937; Commons, 1931). For example, if the product lends itself 
to monopoly provision, like electricity generation, the seller faces no market 
incentive to deliver high quality or keep costs low, and the buyer can anticipate 
devoting significant time and effort to monitoring and policing. As a result, the 
buyer is likely to include terms in the exchange agreement to ensure that such 
activities are contractually permissible. Two product characteristics have received 
considerable focus: the ease or difficulty of specifying the product’s details, and 
the degree to which specialized investments are required to produce the product 
(Brown & Potoski, 2004; Brown et al., 2010; Williamson, 1975, 2002). We 
explain how each of these characteristics can influence the contract-type decision. 
Government agencies buy lots of products that are difficult to specify, includ-
ing information technology systems, advanced weapons systems, and sophisti-
cated program-management services (Lawther, 2002). When it is difficult to 
describe a product’s attributes or performance necessities (i.e., to define its 
requirements), the buyer faces the risk that the product it receives will fail to 
do what it hopes (Praeger, 1994). If the buyer cannot fully specify the product, 
the seller will have difficulty determining the exact cost of producing the pro-
duct. The buyer and seller can reduce this problem by spending time and effort 
to research the product’s specifications before production commences, but such 
efforts are costly. For some products, the specification challenges are so great 
that the cost of figuring out all the details of the product ex ante is prohibitive 
(Masten, 1998). Thus decisions about the product’s details have to be made as 
the product is produced. In these circumstances, the buyer might prefer a fixed- 
price contract so that it can be certain of the price, but contracts for products that 
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are difficult to specify will be incomplete (Saussier, 2000). Instead, a seller is 
only likely to offer a bid if a cost-reimbursement contract is the selected pay-
ment method, since this design gives some assurance that it will recoup its costs. 
When a product is difficult to specify, a purchasing government will likely sel-
ect a cost-reimbursement contract over a fixed-price contract. 
Government agencies also buy many products that require specialized invest-
ments, including nuclear waste facilities, high-security prisons, and unique com-
munication systems. When one or both parties have to make investments to 
produce a product that cannot easily be deployed to other activities, each will 
find it difficult to exit the exchange. The field of transaction cost economics 
refers to this as the “lock-in” or “hold up” problem (Tirole, 1986; Williamson, 
1985). In such cases, the seller may have to develop a unique production pro-
cess. If the buyer elects not to complete the transaction, the seller is stuck with 
a product that only one buyer wants and a production process that cannot be eas-
ily used to produce products for alternative buyers. The seller now faces the risk 
that the buyer may behave opportunistically and fail to fully compensate the 
seller. Once the seller has made the initial investment in the production process, 
the buyer has an advantage in subsequent rounds of contracting. The costs for 
others to enter the market will be much higher than for the seller that won 
the first contract. The buyer may find no alternatives beyond the originally 
selected seller. The risk is that once locked-in, the seller can behave opportunis-
tically by raising the price or lowering the quality of the product in subsequent 
rounds of contracting (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Kelman, 1990). Generally 
speaking, buyers will prefer fixed-price contracts in these circumstances, to 
ensure that they do not overpay for the product, and sellers will prefer cost- 
reimbursement contracts, so that they can fully recoup the sunk costs of their 
specialized investments. 
As we specify in Hypothesis 1, the use of cost-reimbursement contracts will 
be more likely for products that are difficult to specify and require specialized 
investments in comparison to those that do not.  
H1: For exchanges between a purchasing government and private vendors, the 
probability of a cost-reimbursement contract governing the exchange will be 
greater for products that are difficult to specify and require specialized investments 
than for products that are easy to specify and do not require specialized 
investments.  
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
When a buyer and a seller enter into an exchange, they each seek terms that will 
favor their interests. A buyer seeks a product at a price it can afford, and a seller 
seeks payment above its costs of production. In some circumstances, the seller 
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may find itself in an advantageous position relative to the buyer; for example, if 
it is the only provider of a product the buyer desires. In other cases, the buyer 
may have the advantage; for example, if it is the only purchaser of a product for 
which there are multiple sellers. We make the simple assumption that when the 
buyer has the advantage, it will prefer a fixed-price contract in the belief that it 
will increase the chances of receiving a product at or close to the expected cost. 
Alternatively, when the seller has the advantage, it will prefer a cost-reimburse-
ment contract because it offers a greater opportunity to increase the product’s 
price in comparison with a fixed-price contract.5 
In markets thick with sellers, any single buyer has relative freedom to enter 
into exchanges that best suit its interests. As markets become thinner, a buyer 
can become increasingly dependent on a single or limited set of providers of 
the resource it seeks. Designing a contract in a thin market can mean settling 
for a contract type that is less than ideal in order to secure necessary resources.6 
Sellers gain bargaining power, as there are fewer vendors which can offer the 
product the buyer desires (Bacharach & Lawler, 1984; Root, 1988). The seller’s 
bargaining power is prospective in the sense that under U.S. federal contracting 
practice, no individual seller can demand a specific contract type.7 Instead, mar-
ket conditions may cause buyers to select a particular method of payment before 
going out to market in order to increase the odds that sellers will be willing to 
bid and enter the exchange. As we specify in Hypothesis 2, as government pro-
curement personnel scan the market, cost-reimbursement contracts will be less 
likely in competitive markets with many sellers. 
H2: For exchanges between purchasing governments and private vendors, the prob-
ability of a cost-reimbursement contract governing the exchange will decrease as the 
number of sellers of the product increases.  
Alternatively, in markets with few buyers, prospective sellers find themselves 
with limited alternatives for their products. In these circumstances, a seller may 
be more likely to bid on and enter into a contract where it bears the risk of cost 
overruns because it is dependent on the flow of financial resources (Salancik, 
1979). As we specify in Hypothesis 3, cost-reimbursement contracts will be less 
likely in markets with few buyers than in markets thick with buyers. 
H3: For exchanges between purchasing governments and private vendors, the prob-
ability of a cost-reimbursement contract governing the exchange will decrease as the 
number of buyers of the product decreases.  
In addition to the number of buyers and sellers in the market, the relative 
dependence of sellers on a given purchaser may impact contract type. Even in 
markets with multiple buyers, a single buyer or a small group of buyers may 
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dominate the market through their scale of purchasing (i.e., their market power), 
allowing them to set favorable terms in exchanges with sellers. It has been 
shown, for example, that health management organizations pay lower prices 
for certain hospital services as their footprints in the health market increase 
(Feldman & Wholey, 2001). Likewise, the purchasing power enjoyed by the 
military in some defense products markets allows it to exert a downward press-
ure on the prices it pays for such goods (Day, 2012). These patterns should 
extend to contract type as well. If sellers are relatively dependent on a single 
purchaser for sales of their products, and hence their revenue, that purchaser 
may have leverage to set contract terms. Sellers in a market with a dominant 
buyer may be more willing to accept the risk associated with a fixed-price con-
tract. As we specify in Hypothesis 4, cost-reimbursement contracts are less 
likely in markets in which the government has significant market share. 
H4: For exchanges between purchasing governments and private vendors, the prob-
ability of a cost-reimbursement contract governing the exchange will decrease as the 
purchasing government’s market power increases.  
EXPECTATIONS 
Our conceptual framework identifies factors that will influence the type of con-
tract to govern the exchange. We have explicitly designed our framework to be 
generic and applicable to purchasing governments in general. However, we 
draw data from the defense contracting arena and focus on a single government 
agency, the Department of Defense (DoD). While defense contracting involves 
unique challenges (e.g., warzone acquisitions) and is governed by the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFAS), the same basic dynamics present 
in government contracting in general are also present in defense contracting 
(e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012). Furthermore, the basic 
product characteristics and market characteristics that influence contracting in 
general should have similar effects on contracting by the DoD (Harmon & Scot, 
2013; McGowan & Vendrzyk, 2002; Rogerson, 1994; Williamson, 1967). 
Recall that contracts between U.S. federal government agencies and vendors 
are governed by a set of regulations that promote, and in some cases mandate, 
the use of fixed-price contracts. Our initial expectation is that the use of cost- 
reimbursement contracts will be uncommon. However, the presence of con-
ditions identified by our conceptual framework will increase the chance that a 
cost-reimbursement contract will be used. Specifically, when the product is dif-
ficult to describe and requires specialized investments, and there are few sellers 
but many buyers of the product, the use of cost-reimbursement contracts is 
likely to increase. 
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Data and Methods 
We draw data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the Benchmark 
Input-Output Tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and a survey of federal 
contract personnel of our own design. The FPDS catalogs all contract actions 
reported by 66 federal agencies (e.g., 5,614,758 contract actions were reported 
in the FPDS in FY 2009). To construct a database of contracts, we selected the 
DoD as the focus of the study. We selected the DoD because it is the largest pur-
chaser in the federal government, buying large volumes of simple products that are 
easy to describe and easy to make, such as landscaping and laundry services, and 
complex products that are difficult to describe and difficult to make, such as pro-
gram-management services and guided missiles. This allows us to control for 
agency-level factors that might influence contract-design decisions and to focus 
instead on product characteristics and market conditions. We then identified 29 
products commonly purchased by the DoD. Federal agencies buy products under 
two industry standard product categorization schemes—the North American Indus-
try Classification System (NAICS) and the Product Services Code (PSC) system. 
We selected products that had uniform NAICS and PSC categorizations. Appendix 
1 reports the NAICS and PSC categorizations for the 29 products in our sample. 
We then drew a stratified random sample from all contract actions for each product 
category from FY2004 to FY 2008.8 The unit of analysis is the initial contract 
agreement.9 To create our stratified random sample, we created lists of all contract 
actions signed from FY 2004 to FY 2008 for the 29 product types. 
The FPDS is the most comprehensive catalogue of federal contracting actions 
available. Contract managers from across the federal government are required to 
input data on a standardized form about the contract actions they engage in with 
each contract they oversee. This provides a remarkable window into the contract- 
type decisions of agencies. Like all datasets, the FPDS has flaws. Most notably, 
there is no systematic way to monitor how contract managers actually input the 
data; as a result, many records are incomplete. In constructing our sample, we 
took care to ensure that we only drew complete, comparable records. For this rea-
son, the actual sample size for each product type is less than 100 in most cases.10 
VARIABLES 
In this section, we describe the dependent, independent, and control variables 
used in our analysis. 
Dependent Variable 
To measure contract type, we use the contract type in the original base contract 
agreement. Following the FAR, the FPDS identifies 14 different types of contracts 
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based on payment method, including five variations on cost-reimbursement 
contracts, six variations on fixed-price contracts, labor-hour contracts, time- 
and-materials contracts, and order-dependent contracts in which the payment 
method is determined separately for each acquisition off a master contract. 
We combined all of the cost-reimbursement contracts into a single cost- 
reimbursement category. We did the same for all of the fixed-price contracts. 
Time-and-materials contracts and labor-hour contracts are variations on the 
traditional cost-reimbursement contract because labor hours can be adjusted later 
if requirements and funding are uncertain. Like cost-reimbursement contracts, 
these two contract types provide no positive profit incentive to the vendor for cost 
control or efficiency (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, 2009b, 
2009c). In addition, the Government Accountability Office classifies order con-
tracts as partial cost-reimbursement contracts, because they each lack clarity about 
the extent of cost-reimbursement obligations (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2009a). For these reasons, we combined time-and-materials, labor-hour, 
and order contracts into the cost-reimbursement category. Our dependent 
variable, Cost-Reimbursement Contract, is a dummy variable coded “1” for 
cost-reimbursement contract types, and coded “0” for fixed-price contract types. 
Independent Variables 
To measure product characteristics, we conducted an original survey of federal 
procurement personnel which asked respondents to rate each of the 29 products 
in our sample on the two characteristics identified earlier—the ease or difficulty 
of specification, and the degree to which specialized investments are required to 
make the product.11 This effort to codify product characteristics at the federal 
level is the first we are aware of to tap the experience of those who do the actual 
purchasing of these types of products. 
With this list of 29 products, we surveyed members of the National Contract 
Management Association (NCMA), a membership organization of public pro-
curement personnel.12 We administered the survey through NCMA’s biweekly 
e-mail newsletter, sending out a link in two successive surveys. One-hundred 
and twenty-nine former and current federal procurement personnel began the 
survey, and 99 provided product ratings, for an effective sample size of n à 99. 
The response rate was low—less than 5%  of the mailing list—but the respon-
dents represent an array of federal procurement personnel with varying levels of 
education and experience. Table 1 provides information on the characteristics of 
respondents who provided background information. Approximately two thirds 
of the respondents worked in the public sector at the time of the survey. On 
average, respondents had 15 years of experience in public procurement.13 Half 
reported they were currently working for the DoD.14 
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Our measures of product characteristics are derivative of well-established 
measures in the extant literature (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Hefetz & Warner, 
2012; Lamothe & Lamothe, 2012; Levin & Tadelis, 2010). We followed the 
measurement scheme of Brown and Potoski (2005), with some important 
improvements. To assess the ease or difficulty of specifying the product’s attri-
butes and requirements, survey respondents were asked to rate each product on a 
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that “requirements definition” was easy, and 5 
indicating that it was difficult.15 To assess the degree of specialized investments 
required to produce a product, survey respondents were asked to rate each pro-
duct on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating a low level of specialized invest-
ments, and 5 indicating a high level. In order to address instrumentation bias, 
respondents first rated the ease of requirements definition for all 29 products, 
followed by a series of questions about federal procurement practice, and then 
rated the degree of specialized investments for each product. As another check 
on instrumentation bias, for each respondent the presentation of the 29 products 
was randomized for each characteristic.16 Table 2 reports the mean ratings, 
standard deviations, and number of valid responses for each product. The 
first column reports the product category. The second and third columns report 
the ease of measurement and specialized investment ratings, respectively. 
Table 1. Characteristics of Respondents to 2013 Survey of National Contract 
Management Association Members 
Characteristic Frequency (M) Percent (SD) Range  
Sector (n à 78)  
Public 52  66.7 —  
Private 23  29.5 —  
Nonprofit 3  03.8 — 
Position (n à 79)  
Contract manager 24  30.4 —  
Contract specialist 25  31.6 —  
Procurement analyst 10  12.7 —  
Supply-management specialist 1  01.3 —  
Other 19  24.1 — 
Highest Level of Education (n à 80)  
Some college 3  03.8 —  
Associate’s degree 4  05.0 —  
Bachelor’s degree 28  35.0 —  
Graduate degree 45  56.3 —  
Employed at DoD (n à 80) 40  50.0 —  
Years in public procurement (n à 77) (15.0)  (11.0) 0–38  
Years in private procurement (n à 78) (07.5)  (10.1) 0–35 
Notes: Means and standard deviations are reported in parentheses for continuous variables.   
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The fourth column reports the combined mean ease of measurement and specia-
lized investments ratings. 
The ratings of the 29 products vary significantly. Landscaping, janitorial, 
laundry, and trash-collection services all have ease of measurement and 
specialized investment scores between 1 and 2. The more defense-specific 
services, meanwhile, almost uniformly score very highly on the two charac-
teristics. The ease of measurement and specialization scores for the aircraft 
and weapons development services, for example, are all above 4—indicating 
that these services are difficult to specify in a contract and require specia-
lized investments that cannot easily be transferred. Table 2 also indicates 
that the DoD purchases a number of products with moderate complexity 
scores, including logistics support, program review and management, legal 
services, and program development. Even with steps to address instrumen-
tation bias, in the aggregate respondents rated the products similarly on both 
dimensions (r2 à 0.93). To address the collinearity of the measures, we com-
bined the two scores into a single product-characteristic score with a range 
from 2 to 10 (see the last column in Table 3). Products with low scores 
are simple—easy to specify and easy to make, and products with high scores 
are complex—difficult to specify and difficult to make. We label this vari-
able Product Complexity.17 
We measured market characteristics in a variety of ways. First, in order to 
gauge the number of sellers of a particular product (see Hypothesis 2), we 
measured whether agencies opted to go out for bids or sought a waiver from 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Defense Contracts Included in Study 
Variable M SD Min Max  
Dependent variable  
Cost-reimbursement contract  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Independent variables  
Product complexity  5.94  2.03  3.08  9.01  
Competition procedure  0.64  0.48  0  1  
DoD percentage of sales  10.66  13.90  0.48  53.76  
Number of purchasing industries  302.63  168.73  4  425  
FY 2005  0.14  0.35  0  1  
FY 2006  0.16  0.37  0  1  
FY 2007  0.27  0.44  0  1  
FY 2008  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Notes: n à 2,420. For Competition Procedure, a “1” indicates that an agency went out for 
competitive bids. Product Complexity scores are taken from a 2013 Survey of National Contract 
Management Association members; all other data are taken from the Federal Procurement Data 
System.   
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competitive bidding. The FAR permits government agencies to forgo com-
petitive bidding when an agency can demonstrate that there is only one 
source that can satisfy its requirements, the need is urgent, a statute or inter-
national agreement provides authorization, or for a series of other special 
purposes (FAR 6.302). This variable provides some insight into whether 
the purchasing government identifies multiple prospective sellers in the 
Table 3. Ease of Measurement and Specialized Investment Ratings of 29 
Products Commonly Purchased by DoD 






M SD N M SD N Score  
Trash/garbage collection services  1.73  1.02 84  1.35  0.61 71  3.08 
Landscaping/grounds-keeping services  1.81  0.97 85  1.35  0.70 72  3.16 
Laundry and dry-cleaning services  1.81  1.04 80  1.45  0.71 71  3.26 
Custodial janitorial services  1.97  1.07 87  1.33  0.65 72  3.30 
Court-reporting services  1.92  0.90 75  1.59  0.93 68  3.51 
Warehousing and storage services  1.92  0.95 83  1.70  0.88 69  3.61 
Guard services  2.27  1.06 86  1.51  0.88 71  3.77 
Advertising services  2.66  1.14 79  1.77  0.78 70  4.43 
Auditing services  2.73  1.00 85  2.04  0.96 71  4.77 
Legal services  2.87  1.21 79  2.10  1.10 71  4.97 
Training/curriculum development  2.87  1.13 90  2.15  0.94 73  5.02 
Maintenance and equipment repair  2.74  1.09 87  2.49  1.05 72  5.22 
Program management/support services  3.15  1.12 93  2.47  1.08 75  5.62 
Logistics support services  3.01  1.07 82  2.62  1.09 71  5.63 
Program review/development service  3.41  1.14 87  2.46  1.10 70  5.87 
Guns (30 mm)  2.61  1.22 64  3.28  1.31 57  5.89 
Engineering and technical services  3.77  1.11 88  2.99  1.18 71  6.76 
Bombs  3.34  1.31 58  4.04  1.09 53  7.38 
Systems development services  4.12  1.15 75  3.46  1.21 65  7.58 
Weapons—basic research  3.88  1.23 67  3.72  1.11 57  7.60 
Defense aircraft—basic research  3.89  1.28 63  4.05  1.07 58  7.94 
Aircraft, fixed-wing  3.79  1.36 62  4.29  0.97 56  8.08 
Defense aircraft—engineering 
development  
4.13  1.13 63  4.33  0.83 57  8.46 
Weapons—applied R&D  4.13  1.18 63  4.47  0.72 55  8.60 
Defense aircraft—applied R&D  4.18  1.20 60  4.47  0.79 55  8.66 
Guided missiles  4.10  1.22 62  4.62  0.63 52  8.71 
Weapons—advanced development  4.29  1.11 63  4.59  0.60 54  8.88 
Defense aircraft—advanced development  4.37  1.07 62  4.64  0.59 55  9.01 
Submarines  4.21  1.21 57  4.80  0.56 55  9.01 
Notes: Data are from a 2013 Survey of National Contract Management Association members. The 
Product Complexity scores are simple sums of the ease of measurement and specialized investment 
scores.   
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market. If the purchasing government opts to employ the competition 
procedure, it presumably anticipates receiving multiple bids. We label this 
dichotomous variable Competition Procedure, coded as “1” if the agency 
went out for competitive bids, else “0.” 
We draw data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Input/Output Tables to 
measure buyer scarcity (see Hypothesis 3); we use the data to calculate the total 
number of industries that purchase the product. A lower number of industries 
that purchase the product represents a scarcity of buyers and suggests that the 
purchasing agency will have a position of advantage in the market. We label this 
continuous variable as Number of Purchasing Industries.18 
Finally, to assess the DoD’s market power (Hypothesis 4), we include a 
measure of the percentage (ranging from 0 to 100) of total sales in each product 
category that the agency purchases. This variable is labeled DoD Percentage of 
Sales. 
Given research that shows that markets vary across urban, suburban, and 
rural locations (e.g., Warner & Hefetz, 2003), ideally we would include mea-
sures of the location of the contract. Unfortunately, FPDS contract records do 
not consistently report this information. 
Control Variables 
We include one set of control variables in our analysis. We include dummy vari-
ables for each of the five years of data in our sample, coded “1” for each year, 
else “0.” In our empirical analysis, we use FY 2004 as the base year. 
EMPIRICAL METHODS 
Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression to 
analyze the data. All estimation was done in SPSS 17.0. Table 3 provides the 
basic descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis. 
Results 
This section presents the results of our analysis. Before turning to the logistic 
regression results that inform the hypotheses of this study, we note that 26% 
of the DoD contracts in our sample were cost-reimbursement. This confirms 
our overall expectation that the fixed-price contract is the dominant contract 
type at the federal level. Table 4 reports the logistic regression results, including 
the coefficient, standard error, and odds ratio for the variables in our analysis. 
The results of the logistic regression analysis provide consistent support for 
our hypotheses about product characteristics and inconclusive results for our 
hypotheses about market conditions. 
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PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results indicate that cost-reimbursement con-
tracts were more likely when contracting for complex products, those that are 
difficult to specify and require specialized investments. In Table 4, the coef-
ficient for Product Complexity is positive and statistically significant at the 
0.0001 level. Holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in Product 
Complexity increases the odds of a cost-reimbursement contract by 3.068 times. 
MARKET CONDITIONS 
When the other variables in our model are held at their means, the coefficient for 
the variable Competition Procedure is positive and statistically significant at the 
0.1 level. Holding all other variables constant, when the DoD opted to go out for 
competitive bids during the time period of our analysis, it was 1.283 times more 
likely to use a cost-reimbursement contract than a fixed-price contract. This runs 
counter to Hypothesis 2, which argues that as the number of vendors increases, 
the likelihood of a cost-reimbursement contract will decrease. We present a 
possible explanation for this apparently counterintuitive finding in the dis-
cussion section. 
The results for the variables measuring market conditions—Competition Pro-
cedure, DoD Percentage of Sales, and Number of Purchasing Industries— 
provide support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The coefficient for the variable Number 
Table 4. Logistic Regression Results of Impact of Independent Variables on 
Use of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts by DoD, 2004–2008 
Variables b SE Odds ratio  
Product complexity  1.121****  0.053  3.068 
Competition procedure  0.249*  0.139  1.283 
DoD %  of sales   0.047****  0.007  0.954 
No. of purchasing industries  0.003****  0.000  1.003 
FY 2005   0.630***  0.209  0.532 
FY 2006   0.347*  0.198  0.707 
FY 2007   0.012  0.168  0.989 
FY 2008  0.110  0.176  1.116 
Constant   8.949****  0.405  0.000 
v2    903.229**** 
Cox-Snell R2    0.311 
Notes: n à 2,420. For Competition Procedure, a “1” indicates that an agency went out for 
competitive bids. Product Complexity scores are taken from a 2013 Survey of National Contract 
Management Association members; all other data are taken from the Federal Procurement Data 
System. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001.   
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of Purchasing Industries is positive and significant (p < 0.0001). As this variable 
increases by one unit, the odds that an exchange will be governed by a cost- 
reimbursement contract increase by a factor of 1.003. While this odds ratio 
may appear small, it is important to remember that the range and standard devi-
ation of the variable are substantial. This means that Number of Purchasing 
Industries has a significant impact on contract type across the services in our 
sample. More buyers increase the likelihood of a cost-reimbursement contract. 
This finding is consistent with our third hypothesis, which posits that purchasers 
—in this case the DoD—will demand fixed-price contracts from vendors when 
the number of purchasers is relatively low. 
Finally, the coefficient for the variable DoD Percentage of Sales is negative 
and significant (p < 0.0001). Holding all other variables constant, a one-unit 
increase in DoD Percentage of Sales decreases the odds of a cost-reimburse-
ment contract by 0.954. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 4—the 
use of cost-reimbursement contracts declines as the DoD gains market power. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
The logistic regression results in Table 4 show that the coefficients on all four 
time variables vary in sign and significance, with the negative and significant 
coefficients for the first two years—FY 2005 and FY 2006. This suggests that 
the likelihood of using a cost-reimbursement contract decreased for these two 
years relative to FY 2004 (all else equal). 
Discussion 
Federal regulatory policy and guidance promote, and sometimes mandate, the 
use of fixed-price contracts because this contract type is thought to lower the 
risk of cost overruns and receipt of a poor-quality product. The data we analyze 
suggest that the FAR has largely succeeded in promoting this contract type— 
three quarters of the contracts in our sample were fixed-price. We assessed 
the impact of two categories of variables—product characteristics and market 
conditions—on the variable use of these two contract types. Our results strongly 
support conventional wisdom: product characteristics and market conditions 
drive contract-type decisions. We discuss product characteristics and market 
conditions below. 
PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS 
The results of our empirical analysis provide strong evidence that contract type 
is driven by the characteristics of the product to be acquired. When products are 
easy to specify and do not require specialized investments, the DoD is likely to 
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offer a fixed-price contract when it goes out for bid, and vendors are willing to 
accept these terms. For example, in our sample, 100%  of contracts for landscap-
ing, a simple product, are fixed-price.19 This is consistent with expectations. 
When neither party faces the risk of becoming locked in to the exchange, and 
the government agency can specify in clear detail what it wants before pro-
duction commences, the vendor faces a lower risk of cost overruns. In fact, 
agreeing to a fixed-price contract may incentivize the vendor to find ways to 
deliver the specified product at a lower cost because it pockets the difference. 
Alternatively, when products are difficult to specify and require specialized 
investments, the likelihood of a cost-reimbursement contract increases. For 
example, in our sample, 54%  of contracts for computer system development, 
a complex product, are cost-reimbursement. The vendor is unlikely to agree 
to a fixed-price contract ex ante if much is unknown about the steps needed 
to produce the product and how much it will cost. The risk of losing out finan-
cially increases if the product requires specialized investments, since the vendor 
and the purchasing agency are likely to become locked in to the exchange. 
Under these circumstances, if the purchasing agency wants the product, it 
may have no choice but to offer a cost-reimbursement contract, even though 
there is a risk that the vendor will “gold-plate” the product by adding expensive 
options that the purchasing agency does not need. 
Figure 1 reports the percentage of cost-reimbursement contracts in our sam-
ple along the y-axis by the variable product complexity on the x-axis. This iso-
lated examination of the impact of the variable product complexity is consistent 
with the logistic regression results. In general, as product complexity increases, 
the use of cost-reimbursement contracts increases. Yet there are some products 
with high ratings of product complexity that also show notable reliance on 
Figure 1. Use of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts by Mean Product Rating.  
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fixed-price contracts. Guided missiles, for example, have a mean product rating 
of 8.71, yet over 70%  of the contracts in our sample are fixed-price, an apparent 
“mismatch.” One interpretation of this result is that the transaction cost frame-
work we have outlined in this article does a poorer job of explaining contracting 
decisions for complex products and signals a possible mismanagement risk by 
the DoD. By making vendors responsible for unexpected costs, the DoD may 
be exposing them to excessive financial strain and constraining production in 
ways that are ultimately self-defeating. 
There are reasons to believe that this interpretation may not be accurate. With 
complex products, the risk of negative contract outcomes is often most acute in 
the early stages of development and production (e.g., Brown, Potoski, & Van 
Slyke, 2015). It is then that product requirements and possibilities will be most 
uncertain; and it is then that the vendor will actually be making the bulk of its 
specialized investments. Once a product has been developed, tested, and evalu-
ated, both parties are likely to have a solid understanding of its specifications 
and costs, and the vendor should have begun to recoup the cost of the specia-
lized investments. It will then become more feasible to use to a fixed-price con-
tract. When complex products reach the stage of regular production, fixed-price 
arrangements should become more common. This logic may help explain the 
pattern observed in Figure 1. By and large, the complex products with high 
levels of cost-reimbursement contracting—weapons advanced development 
(92%), for example—are potential early-stage activities. Those with higher 
levels of fixed-price contracting appear to be products that have moved beyond 
the research-and-development phase. Certain categories of products with high 
complexity scores—guns, bombs, fixed-wing aircraft, and guided missiles— 
may have moved into more routine and standardized production. An illustrative 
example of such a product is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the kit 
that converts conventional “dumb bombs” into GPS-guided missiles. Once a 
revolutionary, cutting-edge product, JDAMs are now purchased in bulk by 
the DoD with fixed-price contracts.20 This is why the details of any exchange 
matter. Here an apparent mismatch may not signal an increased level of risk 
or the weakness of the framework. 
To further test this argument, we performed a supplementary analysis that 
examined how much of the variation in contract type could be explained by 
our measure of product complexity and an additional dummy variable specify-
ing categories of complex products that are likely to involve routine and stan-
dardized production. This model correctly predicted contract type in 82%  of 
cases.21 This analysis provides evidence that a transaction cost framework that 
takes production stage into account provides a robust explanation of contract- 
type decisions. It also suggests that DoD acquisition practices are sensitive to 
the unique risks associated with the products it purchases. 
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MARKET CONDITIONS 
Our results also provide support for the impact of market conditions on contract- 
type decisions. In theory, if the market for a product is thick with buyers, ven-
dors are in a better position to set favorable terms, in this case a cost-reimburse-
ment contract. Markets with fewer buyers present less of an advantage to 
vendors, and the likelihood of a cost-reimbursement contract for the product 
should diminish. On the flipside, a thicker market of vendors should provide 
purchasing agencies an advantage: if one vendor does not agree to terms, the 
purchasing government can select another vendor. Two of the variables in our 
analysis provide support for these arguments. On the demand side, as the DoD’s 
percentage of market share increases, the likelihood of a fixed-price contract 
increases. This suggests that the DoD is able to exercise its market power to 
set more favorable contract terms. On the supply side, as the number of purchas-
ing industries increases, the likelihood of a cost-reimbursement contract 
increases. This result suggests that in those instances when the vendor has 
choices about who to sell products to, it can seek out exchange partners that 
offer more favorable contract terms. At face value, the results for the use of 
the competition procedure provide contrary evidence. Notably, when purchasing 
agencies go out for bid, they are more likely to rely on cost-reimbursement con-
tracts than when they sole-source a contract. To explain this contrary finding, 
we interviewed a handful of federal procurement professionals.22 The federal 
procurement professionals all offered a consistent explanation: when agencies 
opt to sole-source a contract, they are often buying simple products that are 
easily specified and easy for the firm to produce. In this way, the variable 
Competition Procedure is less of a proxy for supply-side market conditions than 
for the type of products agencies purchase. 
Conclusion 
The data and examples we present here illustrate the value of the transaction cost 
framework for explaining contract-type decisions. As the theory predicts, cost- 
reimbursement contracts are commonly used for complex products in thin mar-
kets, and fixed-price contracts tend to predominate for simple products in thick 
markets and proven complex products that have moved beyond research-and- 
development into the production phase. Contrary to the implicit assumption of 
the Obama administration’s 2009 guidance to agencies, the results presented here 
suggest that agencies have largely followed federal procurement regulations and 
contracting guidance. Of the 29 products in our sample, there is a clear alignment 
between product characteristics and contract type in the vast majority of cases. In 
those few instances in which there is an apparent mismatch between product 
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characteristics and contract type, government agencies are likely using cost-reim-
bursement contracts in the product-development phase and then switching to 
fixed-price contracts once the product’s attributes have been more precisely 
determined and more routine production processes developed. 
Our results suggest that influencing what the government buys will likely have 
more impact on the use of cost-reimbursement contracts than further regulating 
how government agencies buy products. The agencies in our sample appear to 
be following existing regulatory guidance rather than flouting it. If legislative 
and executive overseers are driven to mitigate risk in contracting by reducing 
the number of cost-reimbursement contracts, their best strategy may be guiding 
agencies to buy more simple products and fewer complex products. 
Our research affirms conventional contracting practice while controlling for 
other factors. A primary contribution of our research is that it provides a foun-
dational set of conditions for modeling contract outcomes, such as cost over-
runs, delivery delays, and poor-quality products. This sets the stage for future 
scholarly inquiry into the impact of contract type on contract outcomes. Finally, 
we have generated novel measures of important characteristics of 29 different 
products. Some of these products are unique to the DoD (e.g., guided missiles), 
but other products in our sample are purchased widely across government agen-
cies (e.g., laundry and refuse collection). Other scholars and analysts of procure-
ment and acquisition can apply these measures to the contracting practices of 
other agencies. Specifically, future research can examine whether these primary 
product characteristics influence the use of different contract types—fixed-price 
versus cost-reimbursement—as our data suggest. 
Like any investigation, our analysis is limited in some way. Many of our 
measures would benefit from increased precision, particularly our measures of 
market conditions. For example, we used national-level data on the number 
of industries that purchase the 29 products in our sample to gauge the size of 
the market for each. Ideally, market measures would be more closely tied to 
the particular locales in which the exchanges between the DoD and vendors 
are taking place (although the markets for some of the products included in this 
study are more or less national). Our study is also limited in reach in that we 
focus on contract-type decisions, and not on how these decisions impact outputs 
(e.g., whether the contract delivered the product at specifications, on time, and 
within budget) or outcomes (e.g., whether the product contributed positively to 
the pursuit of agency mission, goals, and objectives). The limitations of our 
measures invite improvements, whether in the acquisition of new data or better 
operationalizations with existing data. Ultimately, the value of this inquiry will 
be its contribution to future scholarship that will be able to tie variables like con-
tract type to managerial outputs and outcomes (e.g., Lawther, 2002; Sclar, 
2001). Our hope is that the research we have presented here will spark interest 
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among other public management scholars to focus on how contracts are 
constructed and the impact of different contract types on the managerial impera-
tives governing the transaction. 
Notes 
1. We use the generic term “product” to refer to both goods and services. 
2. See https://www.usaspending.gov. Over the last decade, federal contract spending 
rose from $346 billion in FY 2004 to a high of $541 billion in FY 2008. Contract spending 
has averaged around $450 billion over the last two fiscal years. 
3. For example, the 2007 Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress finds: “The federal acquisition workforce is 
an essential key to success in achieving the government’s missions. Procurement is an increas-
ingly central part of the government’s activities” (U.S. Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 352). 
4. The FAR is a component of the Code of Federal Regulations; specifically, Title 48: 
Federal Acquisition Regulation System. 
5. Obviously there will be circumstances when a buyer prefers a cost-reimbursement 
contract, and a seller, a fixed-cost contract, but all things being equal, we assume that buyers 
are likely to select contract types that keep costs low, and sellers are likely to select contract 
types that augment prices. 
6. Resource dependency theory makes powerful arguments about how the power of one 
organization over another in a relationship influences the structure of the relationship (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 2003; Provan, 1993). We acknowledge the theory’s insights but elect not to draw 
on it in crafting our framework, given that resource dependency theory focuses on ongoing 
interdependent interactions between parties, whereas the contractual-type decisions we exam-
ine typically occur before the exchange occurs and a relationship commences. In instances 
where contractual exchanges become interdependent, resource dependency theory offers a 
potential complement to transaction cost theory (Burt, 1983). 
7. Federal contracting practice requires the purchasing government to determine the 
contract type before going to market (Brown, 2013). 
8. We provided random numbers only to initial contracts, not to all contract actions in 
our sample, so that the probability of being selected is the same across all contracts in the 
population. If we had provided random numbers to all contract actions on a list, contracts with 
more modifications would have been more likely to be selected. 
9. Because contract managers can modify contracts through post-award negotiations 
with vendors, the initial contract does not always reflect the contract that ultimately governs 
the exchange. For this reason, in creating our sample we tracked both initial contract deci-
sions and modified contract decisions. While contract managers in our sample often changed 
contract elements, like contract duration, we found no instances in which the type of contract, 
whether cost-reimbursement or fixed-price, was changed after the initial agreement. 
10. The percentage of incomplete FPDS records is 15.5%  (269 of 1,734). The incom-
plete rates for the DoD are on par with the overall rate of incompletion at 15.2%. 
11. The survey was conducted with a protocol approved through a university’s insti-
tutional review board. 
12. We pretested the survey instrument on a sample of 38 federal procurement personnel 
from a different professional association, the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing 
(NIGP). The pretest provided useful feedback on ways to improve the validity of the survey 
items for the constructs we are interested in. 
13. About 20%  of respondents neglected to provide biographical information. We are 
unable to determine whether they differed from the respondents who did provide information, 
but have no reason to think that they would differ in any systematic way. 
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14. Non-DoD respondents tended to rate products higher on the scales we describe 
below, but the differences were not statistically significant. 
15. “Requirements definition” is a commonly accepted term in procurement, referring to 
the process of writing down a product’s attributes and capabilities. 
16. Appendix 2 reports the wording of the survey prompt for each of the two measures. 
17. There is a growing body of research on complex contracting (e.g., Malatesta & 
Smith, 2014) and product complexity in public sector procurement (e.g., Brown et al., 
2010, 2013).  
18. In separate analyses, we also include a variety of ex post measures of market com-
petitiveness and concentration. These variables include the total number of bids, whether 
there was a single offer or agencies went out for competitive bids, and the percentage of 
the vendor’s total revenue for a given year represented by the contract (this last measure is 
drawn from Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database). None of these measures is statisti-
cally significant or influenced the results for the variables described above. We suspect that 
this is because all of the variables measure information revealed after contract type is set. 
19. Appendix 3 reports the mean product complexity rating and distribution of fixed- 
price and cost-reimbursement contracts for each product in our sample. 
20. See http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3206 and http:// 
www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=5018 (accessed October 6, 2013) 
21. This analysis is based on a logistic regression that added the production stage 
dummy variable to our original model. The dummy variable is statistically significant and 
positive, and the results for the other independent variables remain largely unchanged—the 
magnitude of the coefficients decreases slightly, and the competition variable is no longer 
significant at the 0.05 level. We opt to incorporate this analysis in the discussion rather than 
in our core theoretical argument because our proxy for stage of development—the dummy 
variable—is crude. The coding of the dummy variable is based on NAISC product categories 
rather than detailed contractual information on whether the purchase is for development of the 
product or routine production of the product. 
22. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven current and former senior 
procurement personnel across a variety of federal agencies. All of those interviewed had 
served in a variety of acquisition positions in different agencies. Each interview followed 
the same semi-structured protocol, was recorded by hand, and then coded and scanned for 
key terms. Each interviewee was promised anonymity under a university institutional review 
board process.  
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Appendix 2. Survey Prompts 
Requirements Definition 
Requirements definition involves specifying and describing the attributes and 
performance expectations of a good or service to be acquired. 
At one end of the scale, a good or service has requirements that are EASY 
TO DEFINE if it is relatively straightforward to specify and describe the attri-
butes and performance expectations of the good or service. For easy to define 
services, procurement professionals CAN easily write a contract that clearly 
specifies the good or service the vendor should provide and performance metrics 
for assessing the quality of the good or service. 
At the other end of the scale, a good or service has requirements that are DIF-
FICULT TO DEFINE if it is relatively hard to specify and describe the attri-
butes and performance expectations of the good or service. For difficult to 
define services, procurement professionals CANNOT easily write a contract that 
clearly specifies the good or service the vendor should provide and performance 
metrics for assessing the quality of the good or service. 
Appendix 1. NAICS and PSC Categorizations for 29 Products 
Service NAICS PSC Service NAICS PSC  
Advertising 541810 R701 Solid-waste collection 562111 S205 
Auditing 541211 R704 Warehousing and storage 493110 S215 
Computer system 
development 
541512 D302 Defense aircraft—basic 
research 
541710 AC11 
Court reporting 561492 R606 Defense aircraft—applied 
R&D 
541710 AC12 






Janitorial service 561720 S201 Defense aircraft— 
engineering development 
541330 AC14 
Landscaping 561730 S208 Weapons—basic research 541710 AC51 
Laundry and dry- 
cleaning 
812320 S209 Weapons—applied R&D 541710 AC52 





Logistics support 541614 R706 Guns (30 mm and less) 332994 1005 
Equipment 
maintenance/repair 
811310 J099 Bombs 332993 1325 
Professional and 
management training 
611430 U008 Guided missiles 336414 1410 
Program management/ 
support 
541611 R408 Aircraft, fixed wing 336411 1510 
Program review/ 
development 
541611 R409 Submarines 336611 1904 
Security guard and 
patrol 
561612 S206     
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Degree of Specialized Investment 
Degree of specialized investments refers to whether specialized investments 
are required to produce the good or service. Specialized investments apply to 
the production of one good or service but are very difficult to adapt for the 
production of other goods or services. These specialized investments include:  
.  the use of a specific a location that is only movable at a great cost;  
.  the use of highly specialized human skills that cannot be put to work for 
other purposes;  
.  the use of specialized tools or a complex system designed for a single 
purpose; or  
.  the requirement that the service reach the user within a relatively limited 
period of time or the quality of the service greatly diminishes.  
At one end of the scale, a good or service requires a LOW DEGREE OF 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENTS if no specialized investments are generally 
required to produce the good or service. An example of a good or service with 
a low degree of specialized investments is the production of simple writing 
pens. As a basic assembly line product needing few raw materials, pens can 
be produced in a diversity of locations, with few investments in either physical 
or human assets, and can be used effectively many years after they are produced. 
If the purchasing government finds that the pens it purchases do not meet its 
needs, then it can easily find another vendor. 
At the other end of the scale, a good or service has a HIGH DEGREE OF 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENTS if many specialized investments are generally 
required to produce the good or service. Such specific investments often mean 
that if a government decides to purchase such a good or service, it is more likely 
that only the selected vendor will be available in future rounds of contracting. 
An example of a good or service with a high degree of specialized investments 
is the production of flu vaccines. Producing flu vaccines requires a substantial 
investment in scientific research (a highly specialized human skill) and specia-
lized laboratories and equipment. If the purchasing government finds that the flu 
vaccine it purchases does not meets its needs, then it cannot easily find another 
vendor.   
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Trash/garbage collection services  3.08  100.0  0.0 
Landscaping/grounds-keeping services  3.16  100.0  0.0 
Laundry and dry-cleaning services  3.26  100.0  0.0 
Custodial janitorial services  3.30  98.9  1.1 
Court reporting services  3.51  99.0  1.0 
Warehousing and storage services  3.61  89.0  11.0 
Guard services  3.77  96.6  3.4 
Advertising services  4.43  97.0  3.0 
Auditing services  4.77  73.9  26.0 
Legal services  4.97  93.6  6.4 
Training/curriculum development  5.02  94.4  5.5 
Maintenance and equipment repair  5.22  94.8  5.2 
Program management/support services  5.62  68.9  31.1 
Logistics support services  5.63  58.2  41.8 
Program review/development service  5.87  84.2  15.8 
Guns (30 mm)  5.89  99.0  1.0 
Engineering and technical services  6.76  27.5  72.6 
Bombs  7.38  96.5  3.6 
Systems development services  7.58  46.4  53.6 
Weapons—basic research  7.60  64.9  35.1 
Defense aircraft—basic research  7.94  43.4  56.6 
Aircraft, fixed-wing  8.08  85.0  15.0 
Defense aircraft—engineering development  8.46  23.7  76.4 
Weapons—applied R&D  8.60  19.6  80.5 
Defense aircraft—applied R&D  8.66  35.4  64.5 
Guided missiles  8.71  71.1  28.9 
Weapons—advanced development  8.88  7.7  92.3 
Defense aircraft—advanced development  9.01  18.8  81.3 
Submarines  9.01  33.0  67.0 
Note: n à 2,420 contracts.   
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